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In The Supreme Court
of the State of -Utah
STATE OF UTAH,

Plaintiff-Repsondent,

vs.

Case No.

iJOROTHY BEASLEY,
Defendant-Appellant.

11383

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
The appellant was convicted of the crime of grand
larceny and her motion to quash the jury panel was denied.
She appeals from both the conviction and the denial of her
motion
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The appellant was charged with grand larceny. At her
trial, conducted in the Second Judicial District before the
Honorable John F. Wahlquist, she was found guilty as
d1aJOAd
t» an d sentenced to a term o ff rom one to ten years.
Appellant was placed on probation pending the outcome of
'hi, lppea]

2
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The respondent submits the conviction should be affirmed.

ST A TEMENT OF THE FACTS
The facts as contained in the appellant's brief are accurately represented with the exception as to the fact'
established at the hearing of appellant's motion to quash the
jury panel.
The following is a more accurate representation as to
the findings of the court in that matter:
That the jury commissioners are invested with a
"reasonable latitude of discretion" in selecting
names for the jury list insofar as the persons selected are ... competent to act and determine facts
and apply law ... (T-288).
That the persons selected must be voters and not
merely registered to vote. And even if registration
were all that was required, that selection could, in
good faith, be nonetheless restricted to active voters (T-288).
That while selection is to be made from the assessment rolls, including both real and personal property, a juror selected would qualify if he were on
either roll (T-289).
That a jury commissioner must . . . select individuals who represent a cross section in the sense that
they cannot deliberately exclude any group because of race, creed or color, or age or wealth, other
than that required by statute. But they have poor
discretion (T-289).

That when in the legislation they talk about persons
who have been on the list before, they are talking
about persons who may have served . . . . (T-290).
That colored individuals are not underrepresented
on the '68 list from which the jury was drawn (T290).

That the poor reprentation of Spanish-American
on the list was due to the small per cent who voted
and that there was nothing that would suggest deliberate exclusion (T-291 ).
That the failure to use the full assessment roll did
not constitute prejudice in this case (T-292).
Based upon the above findings, Judge Wahlquist concluded that the action of the jury Commissioners was in
no way prejudicial, and denied appellant's motion. This appeal follows appellant's conviction and the denial of her
motion.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE JURY SELECTED IN THE CASE AT BAR

WAS REPRESENTATIVE OF A FAIR CROSS-SEC-

TION OF THE COMMUNITY AND THEIR SELECTION IN NO WAY VIOLATED THE CONSTITUTION
IN THAT JURY COMMISSIONERS HA VE BROAD
DISCRETIONARY POWERS IN THEIR SELECTING
OF JURORS, AND PREJUDICE WILL NOT BE PRESUME'D IN THE ABSENCE OF A SHOWING OF
FRAUD OR CORRUPTION.
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There is little question as to whether the appellant wd,
entitled to a jury trial after having been charged with grand
larceny. With this contention, the respondent has no argu
ment. But the facts, as well as existing case law, fail to substantiate the assertion that the jury selected in the case at
bar was not representative of a fair cross-section of the
community.
In the case of Ware v. United States, 356 F.2d 787 (D.C
Cir. 1965) the court defined this so-called impartial jury:
... trial by jury ... necessarily contemplates an impartial jury drawn from a cross-section of the community . . . . [This] mean [s] that prospective
jurors shall be seected by court officials without
systematic and intentional exclusion of any ...
groups.
According to the above, it is necessary to show "systematic and intentional exclusion" of certain groups with1r.
the community to defeat the presumed impartiality of the
jury. The appellant, for lack of ability to show such exclusion, was confined to making implications that because
certain segments of society were "inadequately" represented on the master jury list, that arbitrary exclusions were
necessarily the cause.
The bulk of the testimony for the appellant, presentea
during the hearing on her motion to quash, as well as major
potrions of her brief, were for purposes of showing dioproportionate representation by minority groups on th'
master jury list.
The U. S. Supreme Court in Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S
202, 13 L.Ed.2d 759 (1965) has recently stated:
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Neither the jury roll nor the venire need be a perfect mirror of the community or accurately reflect
the proportionate strength of every identifiable
group.
This doctrine was further clarified in the same opinion:
... a defendant in a criminal case is not constitutionally entitled to demand a proportionate number
of his race [or of any race] on the jury which tries
him nor on the venire or jury roll from which petit
jurors are drawn. (Bracketed portion added.)
In the case of Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 797 L. Ed.
469 (1953) which invoved allegation that the selection of
jurors on the basis of property tax lists resulted in a discrimination against Negroes, with the result that fewer Negroes than whites, having regard to their proportion of the
population, appeared on the panels, the Supreme Court, in
holding that no discrimination had been shown, said:
Responsibile as this Court is under the Constitution
to redress ... jury packing ... it should not condemn good faith efforts to secure competent juries
merely because of varying racial proportions.
The Court went on to say:
We do not think a use, nondiscriminatory as to race,
of the tax lists violates the Fourteenth Amendment,
nor can we conclude on the evidence adduced that
the result of the use require a conclusion of uncon~ti tu tionali ty.
In connection with the nonrequirement of proportional
representation on jury lists, as well as juries themselves,

one must recognize the universal doctrine that jury com
missioners are endowed with broad, discretionary po'Ner~
in their selecting of jurors, and prejudice will not be presumed in the absence of a showing of fraud or corruption.
This concept was adequately explained in the California
case of People v. Hess, 234 P.2d 65 (Cal. 1951) wherein the
court stated :
In the selection of names to compose the jury list
the jury commissioner is vested with full power
to decide as to who are qualified to serve and who
are entitled to be excused. Unless such selection is
fradulently made, or made in such a manner as to
deprive an accused of a fair and impartial trial, the
jury commissioner's actions will not be invalidated.
Elsewhere in that same opinion the court explained
the light in which jury commissioner's decisions pertaining to the selecting of jurors should be viewed:
Furtherrnore, the actions of a jury commissioner
in selecting and making up a jury list are presumed
to be valid . and in the absence of some showing of
abuse of discretion by him his actions will not be
disturbed.
In the case of Wiggins v. State, 101 Fla, 404, 134 So.
236 (1931) which likewise involved a motion to quash the
jury because of irregularities in the selecting process, the
Florida Supreme Court ruled:
Commissioners . . . have full power to decide ...
who are fit to serve as jurors or whether certain
persons possess the qualifications prescribed by the

statutes and there will be no intt:rference with their
decision in the absence of a showing of fraud or corruption.
In showing the universality of the court's attitude toward these discretionary powers, a Texas Court proclaimed
m essence:
The venire in a murder prosecution will not be set
aside because jury commissioners selected some
qualified jurors, but disreardged others where there
is nothing to indicate any abuse of discretion lodged in jury commissioners. Walker v. State, 98 Tex.
Crim. 663, 267 S.W. 988 (1924).
And in the case of State v. PieI"Te, 198 La. 619, 3 So.2d
895 (1941):
The law does not direct from what source the commissions shall obtain knowedge of qualified jurors or seek for names .... The law seems to trust
the matter to the discretion of the commissioners ...
In the absence of proof of fraud or designed discrimination, it is to be presumed that the jury commissioners in making up the jury lists performed
their duties within the spirit of the law, and wisely
and well.
Throughout these opinions one 1s overly conscious of
the requirement of fraud, corruption, abuse of discretion,
or designed discrimination before the actions of jury commissions can be nullified or even seriously questioned.
In view of the foregoing, it cannot go without mention,
that during the entire hearing on the motion, a proceeding
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that consumed nearly 300 pages of transcript, not a shred of
evidence was presented which even hinted at fraud, corruption or designed discrimination. And :is far as the al- '
legation of an abuse of discretion is concerned, as the cases
have clearly indicated and as the trial judge concluded,
there was nothing to substantiate that the exercise of the
jury commissioner's discretion was in any way abused.

POINT II
WITH THE EXCEPTION OF COMPLYING WITH
STATUTORILY PROVIDED SELECTION CRITERIA
THE JURY COMMISSIONERS IN NO WAY DISCRIMINATED AGAINST THE YOUNG, THE POOR, AND
THE NON-PROPERTY OWNER.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-46-17 (1953) provides in part that
the jury commissioners are " . . . to select [names for the
jury list] from the names of the legal voters on the assess
ment roll of the county for the current year." From the
face of this statute it is apparent that the young, the poor,
and the non-property owner are in fact discriminated against
as far as their being selected as jurors is concerned, but not
unconstitutionally so.
The U.S. Supreme Court has said:
States should decide for themselves the quality of
their juries as best fits their situation so long as
the classifications have relation to the efficiency
of the jurors and are equally administered. Our duty
to protect the federal constitutional rights of all
does not mean we must or should impose on state'.'
our conception of the proper source of jury lists,
so long as the source reasonably reflects a cross-
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section of the population suitable in character and
intelligence for that civic duty. Brown v. Allen,

supra.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit has concluded:
Neither statutory nor
use of any particular
there is no systematic
any race, creed, social

case-made law requires the
source of names so long as
exclusion of the members of
or economic groups. Padgett
v. Buxton-Smith Mercantile Company, 283 F.2d 597
(10th Cir. 1960).
The above, when taken in connection with the Supreme
Court's ruling in the Brown case, supra, and the universally
recognized holding of People v. Hess, supra, which authorized the use of property tax rolls and voter rolls respectively as sources of names of jurors, would clearly indicate that
exclusion of the groups in question is not only constitutional but has been ratified by the most prominent courts of
the land.
It might be contended that the exclusion of the poor
is nowhere mentioned in these opinions, but it takes little
imagination to equate the poor with the non-property owner.
It is also not inconceivable to equate the young, even though
voters, with, again, the non-property owner. For while the
appellant complains that few young people were included
in the jury list, there is no evidence that such were excluded for other than valid statutory or discretionary reasons.

It has been made abundantly clear in the area of jury
selection that a state statute, even though improvidently
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drafted or inappropriately administered, need not be considered violative of the constitution. As stated in the Swain
case, supra: "An imperfect system for the selection of juries is not equivalent to purposeful discrimination based on
race."
By combining those exclusions authorized by state
statute, those universally accepted in case law, and those
resulting from discretionary powers vested in the jury
commissioners, it is difficult indeed for the appellant to
show unsanctioned discrimination against the young, the
poor, and the non-property owner.
POINT III
THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE PRESENTED THAT
THE JURY COMMISSIONERS DISCRIMINATED
AGAINST P E R S 0 N S OF SPANISH-AMERICAN
ORIGIN OR AGAINST ANY OTHER MINORITY RA
CIAL GROUP WHATSOEVER.
In conjuncition with those cases already cited which
decry the notion of required proportional representation on
juries and jury lists, it is felt that a special point should
be made as to the appellant's allegation that persons rt
Spanish-American origin have been discriminated against
Aside from the implied allegation, for which there i;
little support, that persons have a substantive right to serve
as jurors, the appellant would have us believe that because
those of Spanish-American orogin were not "adequately"
represented on the jury list, that the jury drawn wa3 un·
constitutional. In weighing the probability of such desii;neii
exclusion, it is interesting to note the jury commisisoner'·
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apparent ignorance as to which names may have been of
Spani~h origin. Here again, as the trial court indicated,
,uch other exclusion factors as property ownership and voting may have decidedly limited their participation as prospective jurors.
Two cases seem to be in point as to the questionability
of ltmited racial minority participation on jury lists. The
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit had
the following to say:
The mere fact that the trial jurors drawn from the
list did not contain the various percentages of perosns of a particular nativity, does not show that the
list itself violated the statute. Wong Yim v. United
States, 118 F.2d 667 (9th Cir. 1941).
In the Wong Yim case, supra, it appeared that of the
panel of 35 jurors, 32 were American or of other Caucasian

ancestry, one was of Chinese ancestry and two were of Caucasian-Hawaiian ancestry. The population of the citizenry
of the particular island was in the following approximate
percentages as to ancestry:
American

21-22%

Hawaiian

18-19%

Japanese

18-19%

Portugese

13-14%

Chinese

11-12%

Part Hawaiian

8- 9%

Other

5- 6%

Perhaps the most striking case in point is that of U.S.
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v. Hunt, 265 F.Supp. 178 (W.D. Tex. 1967) where a federal
court recently held in assence:
That Mexican-American constituted 15.4% of community statutorily qualified jury pool whereas jury
panel was composed of 11 % Mexican-Americans did
not constitute such disparity as to indicate discrimination as to Mexican-Americans in selection of
panel even though Mexican-Americans might make
up 36% of the population of the community.
Here again, federal and national standards along with
a complete absence of purposeful discrimination, clearly
indicate a lack of any imprcpriety on the part of the jury
commissioners vis-a-vis the placing of persons of SpanishAmerican origin on the jury list. And as a Pennsylvania
federal court has said:
A party moving to challenge the array of jurors
and to strike the jury panel on grounds of unconstitutional discrimination in the selecting of jurors
has the burden of proving purposeful and intentional discrimination. Dow v. Carnegie-Illinois Steel
Corp .. 100 F.Supp. 494 (W.D. Pa. 1951).
POINT IV
IN THE EVENT CERTAIN IRREGULARITIES OR
IMPROPRIETIES WERE EXERCISED BY THE JURY
COMMISSIONERS IN THE SELECTION PROCESS,
SUCH WERE NOT VIOLATIVE OF THE STATUTORY SCHEME NOR COULD THEY BE CONSIDERED REVERSIBLE ERROR.
In ascertaining what degree of discretion is permitted
the jury commissioners in selecting jurors, so as to in turn
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be able to evaluate the consequences of any deviation from
claimed statutory meaning, it is important to determine
whether the applicable statutes are mandatory or merely directory in nature.
The Utah Supreme Court on more than one occasion,
State v. Dis.efano, 70 Utah 586, 262 P. 113 (1927), Meye,rs
v. Second Judicial District Court, etc, 108 Utah 32, 156 P.2d
711 (1945), has held: "Generally, statutory provisions regarding drawing and summoning of juries are directory
and not mandatory."
The Supreme Court of New Mexico has recently established a similar interpretation: "statutory provisions for the
selection of jurors are generally held to be directory and
not mandatory." State v. Williams, 76 N.M. 578, 417 P.2d
62 ( 1966).
California, somewhat earlier, made a similar pronouncement which is even more appropriate in the instant case:
... the provision of [the] Code of Civil Procedure
that names of jury lists shall be selected from different wards or townships of counties in proportion
to the number of inhabitants, as nearly as can be
estimated, is directory only. In the instant case
there is certainly no abuse of discretion shown on
the part of the board of supervisors in selecting
the lists, and appellant has no just cause of complaint, especially where a jury satisfactory to both
parties was chosen from the particular venire.
People v. Tennant, 32 Cal. App. 1, 88 P.2d 937
(1939).
Because of this generaly prevailing attitude that such
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statutes are directory as opposed to mandatory, it is understandable why the majority of courts fail to be overly concerned when irregularities are discovered in the actual se·
lection process.
In People v. Hess, supra, the court verbalized this ap·
proach to jury selection problems:
As a general rule, errors and irregularities in failing
to comply strictly to the statutes in making up a
jury list, when there is no resultant prejudice to the
parties involved in litigation, does not invalidate
the list.
The Vermont Supreme Court has expanded this doct·
rine to better comport to the factual situation presented in
the instant case:
When essential prov1s1ons of statutes providing
for the selecting, listing, or drawing jurors are not
complied with, this noncompliance can be taken
ad vantage of by a challenge to the array or by any
other proper plea or motion, but that errors and
irregularities in making up a jury list do not invalidate it nor furnish ground for challenge to the
array unless prejudice is shown to have resulted
therefrom. These rules apply to both grand and
petit jurors. State v. Groyet, 119 Vt. 167, 122 A.2d
862 (1956).
In all of the above cases it is either stated or implied
that irregularities in the compiling of jury lists neither
violates the statutory scheme nor render the jury and their
verdicts invalid. It was concluded in the Hess case, supra.
that: "A defendant cannot complain if he is tried by an
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impartial jury and can demand nothing more." In this
connection, it should be pointed out that the appellant had
no contention as to the qualifications or impartiality of the
jury who sat in her particular case. Her contentions involved the jury list as a whole.

In the case of People v. King, 30 Cal. App. 185, 85 P.2d
928 (1938) a California court concluded:

The appellants ... have attacked the procedure followed by the jury commissioner in making up and
submitting such trial jury list. No bias or prejudice
on the part of the commissioner, and the only error
claimed is in his method of procedure in compiling
the list. Unless there be a material departure from
the provisions of the statute which militates to the
prejudice of a defendant, no error can be claimed
in presenting a panel from which a jury is to be
selected. (Emphasis added.)
The highest courts of our neighboring states to the
north and south have reached the same conclusion in cases
involving attempts to quash the jury and its verdict. In
State v. Walters, 610 Idaho 431, 102 P.2d 284 (1940), the
Idaho Supreme Court held:
On motion to quash a jury panel the burden of
showing substantial actual or presumptive prejudice to the rights of defendant rests on the moving
party and must be established by a preponderance
of the proofs.
The Arizona Supreme Court followed some years later
with a holding which in essence went as follows:
Where defendant made no showing that he was or
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may have been prejudiced by the preparation of the
jury list, the utilization of a jury list which had not
been compiled in accordance with statutory requirement of "a list made of all persons within the
county qualified to serve as jurors," which shall
be revised from time to time "to keep it as compete
as practicable," did not require a mistrial. State v.
Little, 87 Ariz. 295, 350 P.2d 756 (1960).
In conclusion, and perhaps most significant as being
representative of Utah law on this whole subject, was this
court's ruling in State v. Dodge, 12 Utah 2d 293, 365 P.2d
798 (1961) where Chief Justice Wade speaking for the
court said:
Prejudice is not presumed from mere error unless
the natural effect of the error is to do harm. There
is no showing here that the jury which tried appellants was not a fair jury taken from a cross-section
of the community in which they were tried, or
that the result of appellants' trial would have been
different.
It was Justice Holmes quoting from People v.
Jewett, 3 Wend. 314 in Rawlins v. Georgia, 201 U.S. 638, 50
L.Ed. 899 (1906), who said, "Even when persons liable to
jury duty under the state law are excluded, it is no ground
for challenge to array, if a sufficient number of unexceptional persons are present."
CONCLUSION
The respondent submits that the jury which tried the
defendant-appellant was selected from a master jury list
which represented a cross-section of the community to the
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1xtent

required by case as well as statutory law; that the;tatutory scheme of Utah governing the selection of juror
was not violated, nor do such statutes violate the constitution in any way. The appellant has failed to show that
the jury commissioners were either arbitrary or capricious
or displayed designed discrimination in their selecting of
jurors. For these reasons, it is further submitted that the
lower court's conviction and ruling on the motion to quash
the jury be affirmed in all respects.
Respectfully submitted,
VERNON B. ROMNEY
Attorney General
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